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Abstract 
The article aims to examine and critically evaluate the idea of sovereignty and the nuances of its verbal 
expression through the concept of strategic narratives, to reveal different models of sovereignty within the 
context of European Union Member States (mainly France, Hungary/Poland) and the European Union 
(EU) since 2017. The article seeks to answer the following questions: What idea of sovereignty has been 
projected to the public in selected European countries and the EU by their political actors since 2017? What 
model, functional limits and narratives do actors forge? 
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Introduction 
The concept of sovereignty is among the most contentious in the political sciences. Its 
perception depends on the events, circumstances, hopes and ideas of a particular era. For 
example, in Antiquity, it was perceived as a cosmological order. In the Middle Ages, 
respublica Christiana, sovereignty was perceived as belonging to God (as a source of 
authority and power). Later, Jean Bodin’s spoke about absolute and perpetual power in 
which supreme power emanated from a single person or exclusive group of individuals 
(Bodin, 1992). Later came the Westphalian perception, as well as the imperial and 
modern(-istic) concepts of sovereignty, the essence of which is territorial definiteness and 
eurocentrism, which is also when national sovereignty and the sovereignty of the people 
were conceptualised. As concepts changed gradually, this study is particularly interested 
in more recent discussions about the concept of EU sovereignty as proposed by French 
President Emmanuel Macron by outlining “six keys to European sovereignty” in 2017 
(Macron, 2017) and based on unified and centralised EU policy in the fields of technology, 
economy, health, security, climate and others (Leonard & Shapiro, 2019; 2020). 
In the EU’s more recent history, the migrant crisis of 2015 stirred debates about the 
concept of EU and member states’ sovereignty. In 2017, French President Emmanuel 
Macron proposed a new take on EU sovereignty in his speech “Initiative for Europe: A 
sovereign, united, democratic Europe”, and in 2019 the EU developed its strategic 
sovereignty paper, which was complemented by other documents that were more issue-
specific (for example, with a focus on Brexit, the Covid-19 pandemic or relations with the 
US and China).  
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In recent years, political actors have drawn on the concept of sovereignty as a means to 
drive mechanisms around changing the functions of the EU and decision-making limits, 
which has also meant that the scope of the concept has expanded into ‘sovereignties’: 
economic, health, data, energy, defence, trade and so on. Further, a strategic function of a 
renewed concept of sovereignty promises a more coherent narrative of Europe and the EU 
in the world (see Heinrichs in this Special Issue). In theory, all subsets of sovereignty – or 
what Mark Leonard and Jeremy Shapiro (2019) call “strategies” – should align through 
one powerful derivative. Further, one of the features of the concept of sovereignty is that 
others must recognise it. However, who recognises the sovereignty of the EU and who 
matters in the process of validation or substantiation? Is it the EU’s institutions, 
individual EU member staates, their citizens or other global players?  
It follows that the question and varying perceptions of sovereignty are becoming an 
increasingly difficult, yet important problem for the EU to address. A theoretical model of 
the concept, presented by some European actors such as Emmanuel Macron, Jean-Claude 
Juncker (former President of the European Commission) and Josep Borrell (High 
Representative of European Union) in their public communications, clashes with 
perceptions and ‘alternative narratives’ (see Introduction of this Special Issue by Chaban, 
Heinrichs, Osička and Zapletalová) formulated and projected by some other actors (e.g. 
far-right movements; see also Popivanov in this Special Issue) that is narratively rooted 
in the past and tradition.  
Moreover, ambiguity and evolution of the concept of sovereignty create new challenges 
and raise dilemmas around unity, identity and the EU’s Self-positioning in the 
international arena. New challenges are foremostly associated with the surge of far-right 
movements who criticise the EU’s neo-liberal identity and its bureaucratic structure as 
well as target a more general context of globalisation (see Popivanov, in this Special Issue). 
In light of these pressures and the geopolitical significance of EU sovereignty, this article 
examines and critically evaluates the idea of sovereignty and the nuances and strategic 
functions of its verbal expression through the prism of strategic narratives (Miskimmon, 
O’Loughlin & Roselle, 2013). It aims to (1) identify conflicting narratives and their main 
components and (2) reveal different models of sovereignty on the level of EU member 
states that have forged an EU solidarity narrative. This article chooses to explore a period 
of three years – 2017-2020. 
The article seeks answers the following questions: what idea of sovereignty has been 
projected to the public in selected European countries and the EU? What model, 
functional limits and narratives of sovereignty do the actors construct? The first part of 
this article summarises the theoretical approach and method. It further establishes 
different categories of sovereignty. The second part examines these categories and their 
use by different EU actors, such as Juncker, Borrell and Macron (all prominent advocates 
of the concept of EU sovereignty) vis-à-vis right-wing parties in France as well as the 
Hungarian and Polish Governments. 
Literature and theoretical approach 
A considerable body of literature has addressed a variety of different concepts of 
sovereignty (Krasner, 1999; Bartelson, 1995; Walker, 2006; Saurugger, 2013). However, 
there are, so far, no dedicated studies to the recently emerging concept of EU sovereignty 
(as a unit) or its perception and acceptance in different EU member states. Existing 




addresses elements of it, for example, sovereignty’s security, defence and economic 
functions (Cafrun & Kirkham, 2019; Yakoviyk, 2020). 
This research into the concept of EU sovereignty draws on the concept of strategic 
narratives (Miskimmon, O’Louglin an Roselle, 2013) to analyse its perceptions in different 
member states. It is important to understand the meaning of a concept, and how it is 
projected by different actors, which conditions shape the perception of the concept, its 
expectations together with elements of the narrative that cause conflict. Strategic 
narrative analysis enables the research methodologically because strategic narratives are 
a tool for political actors to change the discursive environment in which they operate, 
manage expectations and extend their influence. These are narratives about both states 
and the system itself, and about both “who we are” and “what kind of order we want” 
(Miskimmon, O’Louglin an Roselle,  2013, p. 3). Strategic narratives emerge and are 
disseminated and reciprocated through the narrative cycle of formation, projection and 
reception (Miskimmon, O’Louglin an Roselle, 2013, p. 3, 7). I argue that narratives form 
through the differing concepts of sovereignty, are projected in public communication and 
the media and received in the general public in different MS, or reciprocally between the 
different actors involved in forming competing conceptualisations of sovereignty.  
I further use discourse analysis as a complementary methodological strategy by focusing 
on content, participants and context (van Dijk, 2001). Moira Chimombo and Robert 
Roseberry (1998, p. 9) define discourse as a process of communicative action, the material 
expression of which takes the form of a text. In this study, there is important content that 
is defined through the theme (what is a discourse about?) that is developed in discursive 
texts (speeches and written texts). Discourse analysis looks at what meanings actors give 
to words.  
In examining the expressions of sovereignty, this paper distinguishes among three broad 
categories: (1) self-identification with a community; (2) unity and purpose; and (3) 
sovereign and the principle of self-determination. These categories are drawn from the 
relevant literature on political theory and philosophy, and specifically discussions of 
sovereignty as developed by Paul Kahn, Bert van Roermund and Martin Loughlin. While 
these authors usually choose to focus on one of the categories, this article argues that a 
unidimensional perspective fails to acknowledge the complexity of the concept of 
sovereignty. This article proposes, instead, to examine sovereignty by means of exploring 
all three categories in conjunction with each other to grasp the complex nature of the 
concept of sovereignty in a comprehensive manner. 
a) Sovereignty and self-identification with a community: Identification with 
a particular community is a key element in the perception of sovereignty and the 
definition of its functional limits. The main question is “who are we?” when 
identifying elements of the self-identification with a community. To identify with a 
community is to realise that an individual is a part of its values and goals. Khan 
distinguishes two types of identification (Kahn, 2004, p. 260): Firstly, self-
identification with a community takes place through the prism of the customs, 
revolution, history and traditions of a given community – and how such 
communities tell stories about the Self. Such self-identification is equally crucial 
when it comes to the establishment of national communities and elements of how 
people identify with a national community to bestow sovereignty onto national 
governance processes. Sovereignty becomes a means by which destiny, power and 
authority interlink. Secondly, the identification with a community takes place 
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through the prism of international law by which sovereignty is a functioning 
mechanism of how international law can enforce legislation in sovereign states and 
by which individuals might be able to identify not only through the nation-state but 
through the recognition by other actors.  
 
b) Sovereignty, unity and purpose: Unity is a function of self-awareness 
(Roermund, 2006, p. 44, 45), created by conscious individuals who identify with a 
particular community and a shared sense of will and objectives. According to Bert 
Van Roermund (2006, pp. 44-45) “shared intentions are mutual responsiveness, 
commitment to joint activity, commitment to mutual support in the process of that 
joint activity, legislative activity. [...] the agents involved in shared intentional 
action give shape to that unity”. Such shared processes enable unity and purpose 
through time – which also introduces an element of temporality in the forging 
process of a community’s sovereignty (see also Heinrichs in this Special Issue).  
 
c) Sovereign and the principle of self-determination: First of all, in the 
traditional sense, the function of the sovereign is based on authority and power. 
Also, a sovereign is the one who makes the decisions (Schmitt, 2005). People are 
the product of their own decisions (Kahn, 2011, p. 68), which also underlies rational 
sensemaking processes. In a representative democracy, the people give decision-
making power and responsibility to their representatives. In such cases, a 
background of loyalty to a person, institution or other governance entity creates the 
enabling logic of sovereignty through representation. Public power itself (and 
authority) is based on opinion and belief (Loughlin, 2006, p. 63) that such public 
power is legitimate. Theoretically, citizens can be involved in discussions and 
deliberations, and express their positions during elections, plebiscites and protest, 
which is also how sovereignty can be challenged.  
Methodological approach 
This paper draws on a qualitative content analysis of political texts. Actors create and 
transmit discourse and contexts enable discourses. In this paper, the ideological content 
of texts is important. I apply the three categories established above and from the literature 
on sovereignty as indicators for coding texts. I thus specifically examine how actors 
understand the notion of community and self-identification; what unity means and how 
actors define the functional purpose; who actors define as the authority and the sovereign 
and who has the right to decide and self-determination. The content of these categories 
shows us what idea is being disseminated and what direction is being chosen and what 
model of sovereignty actors create and seek to project.  
I focus on French President Emmanuel Macron, the EU’s High Representative Joesp 
Borrell, former European Commssion president Jean-Claude Juncker, and political 
figures from EU member states – Viktor Orbán (Prime Minister of Hungary), Marine Le 
Pen (President of the National Rally). All have recently communicated different 
conceptions of sovereignty in the context of the EU and national contexts. Their function 
as political leaders also give them an opportunity to impact public opinion significantly. 
This study finds that all these actors have proposed different concepts of sovereignty, all 
of which serve different strategic functions. As mentioned above, Emmanuel Macron was 
one of the first to raise and promote the idea of an EU sovereignty with the support of 
Jean-Claude Juncker (Juncker, 2018) and Joesp Borrell (Borrell, 2020) and, therefore, 




sovereignty. In stark contrast to an idea of EU sovereignty, the ruling parties in Poland 
and Hungary and their political leaders, as well as The National Rally in France build 
alternative narratives around the concept of sovereignty and seek to counter the concept 
of EU sovereignty. This links to Popivanov’s paper in this Special Issue in which he reflects 
different notions of the tempo-spatial narrative sensemaking processes of the EU and 
Europe.  
Thus, I will observe three narratives on sovereignty and solidarity in the EU, broadly 
represented by Macron and two EU leaders vis-à-vis the (far)-right discourses in three 
member states (France, Hungary and Poland). I draw on different data for the analysis of 
each group (see Table 1) and focus on flagship texts that outline narratives of sovereignty 
particularly explicitly. Regarding EU sovereignty, the documents were selected on the 
basis of their relevance, circumstances and time sequence from 2017 to 2020. In the case 
of MS sovereignty, national websites (in English and Polish language) are examined, 
where the reaction to EU policies is most visible. Marine le Pen's presidential election 
program was also chosen, expressing her views on the EU and the nation-state 
sovereignty. 
Table 1: Sample for observation 
EU sovereignty  Nationalist/Member States sovereignty  
• “Initiative for Europe: A sovereign, united, 
democratic Europe” by Emmanuel 
Macron 
• “State of the Union 2018: The Hour of 
European Sovereignty” by Jean-Claude 
Juncker 
• policy brief “Strategic sovereignty: How 
Europe can regain the capacity to act” 
• policy brief “The post-coronavirus world is 
already here” by Joesp Borrell 
• analytical articles in media, especially 
Macron’s visions 
• websites (Hungary Today, Hirado, 
Gazeta Wyborcza, Gazetaprawna) 
• 144 Engagements présidentiels, Marine 
Le Pen 2017 
 
The discourse of sovereignty  
In this section, I will analyse the EU-centric concept of sovereignty vis-a-vis nationalist 
conceptions of sovereignty. 
EU sovereignty 
As mentioned above in 2017, French President Emmanuel Macron proposed that Europe 
return to Schuman’s idea of a united Europe by announcing “six keys to European 
sovereignty” (Macron, 2017), namely: defence, migration, Africa and the Mediterranean 
region, ecological and food sovereignty, digital, economic and monetary power as a 
starting point for the concept of an EU-centric sovereignty. 
Self-identification 
According to Macron, the community already exists in the form of the member states and 
their citizens. The community is built through a variety of components: democracy, 
sovereignty, identity, but above all, the community is bound by the balance of values; the 
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relationship with freedom, human rights and justice (Macron, 2017, p. 4). The 
identification through these values becomes an important factor in maintaining a united 
community and they require an identification with the processes underlying such values. 
While Macron (2018) considers that there is a “civil war for European sovereignty”, fought 
over different intentions, fears and imaginations of what Europe is and means he co-
creates the possibility of a founding narrative event – despite questions over when the 
concept of European solidarity truly started and what such a civil war would be fought 
over. Macron crafts a narrative that seeks to reinvigorate the discussions on European 
solidarity and links it to the unified, value-based community. But as it is unclear as to 
when the historical narrative emerged, it also becomes difficult to forge a historical 
narrative that can seek to bind the community together. Historical experiences and 
traumas of individual nations/states are not reflected due to lack of process of such shared 
experiences.  
Unity and purpose 
According to Macron, solidarity must exist on the level of values and in praxis: “In addition 
to these six battles for sovereignty, it is the battle for unity I want to lead. We will never 
have a strong, sovereign Europe if it is not united and coherent within itself” (Macron, 
2017, p.14). For Macron, unity requires, first of all, the de-territorialisation of member 
states, i.e. the abolition of physical borders between states and a fusion of cultural, 
economic and political borders: “we can no longer choose to turn inwards within national 
borders [...] So instead of concentrating all of our energy on our internal divisions, [...] we 
must instead consider how to make a strong Europe” (Macron, 2017, pp. 3, 4.). However, 
the de-terroritorialisation of member states ends with the territorialisation of the whole. 
The union establishes itself against its external borders to exercise its sovereignty, at 
which point the friend-enemy dialectic emerges in Macron’s sensemaking. Macron speaks 
of potential enemies beyond the border, while inside “we” are still trying to create unity. 
The “enemy” threatens the existence of the community and as such is an essential part of 
Macron’s sovereignty narrative. In Macron’s case, the “enemy” is China, the United States 
and Russia. Friends share responsibilities and identify with other members for a common 
purpose. Friends include African, Mediterranean (Juncker, 2018), British and Norwegian 
states. Therefore, it can be said that the concept of sovereignty proposed by Macron has 
the features of a modern (imperial) sovereignty, where a clear distinction is made between 
what is outside (not Europe) and what is inside (Europe); he aims to define territory and 
restore the dialectic of friend and enemy. 
Sovereign and the principle of self-determination 
In the classical interpretation of sovereignty, the sovereign is the one who makes decisions 
for the people and in a modern democracy, the people are the sovereign. They have the 
right to self-determination and the right to choose to whom to delegate power and 
decision-making. Proponents of EU sovereignty (Borrell, Macron) emphasise that the 
right to self-determination should belong to EU citizens who delegate decision-making 
power to representatives in the European Parliament. However, the EU has other 
decision-making bodies (European Commission, European Council, Council of the 
European Union) that could equally function as potential sovereigns presiding over the 
unity of the whole. This raises problems, both ideologically and practically. Ideologically, 
or rather democratically, decision-making shifts to different institutions, even to those 




may hamper the ability of the – undefined – sovereign to act, even in times of crisis. 
Certainly, Macron emphasises that the EU is an overly bureaucratic and technical 
organisation, unable to take effective and speedy decisions (2017, p. 4). However, he 
argues that as a result, the EU is losing authority and loyalty among its citizens. To solve 
this problem, Macron proposes reforms to how the EU functions, for example, through its 
governance mechanisms, including a need for centralisation and more decision-making 
at the EU level. Examples, for Macron, include setting criteria that gradually bring tax 
models closer together, cemented by culture and knowledge (Macron, 2017, p. 15, 16) and 
the establishment of a European military force with a single European doctrine and budget 
– all of which reflect elements of the six key concepts he considers at the core of an EU-
centric approach to sovereignty. 
Macron’s narrative of European sovereignty, becomes a complexio oppositorum, where 
harmony between seemingly incompatible things is sought, such as “sovereignty in 
sovereignty” (sovereign states in sovereign Europe). Macron proposes a modernist model 
of sovereignty, which also means a step away from the past and, crucially, past models of 
sovereignty governance. In this model, sovereignty leaves the confines of the Westphalian 
state towards a supra-sovereign entity: The European Union. The proposed creation of a 
sovereign European Republic is based on the narrative that action on a national level faces 
too many challenges in our modern times and is ill-equipped to deal with global crises, 
such as the global pandemic. As a result, Macron suggests that it is necessary to restore 
the unity of Europe, which is based on republican values: human and civil rights, freedom, 
justice and the ideal of a republic in which citizens are sovereign. While a more general 
consensus exists among key proponents, other actors, such as Juncker, propose that an 
EU-centric approach to sovereignty does not replace national sovereignties (Juncker, 
2018). Such friction shows that even a more coherent understanding of an EU-centric 
narrative of EU sovereignty means that more detailed formulations are far from settled.  
The state and the national(ist) narrative of sovereignty 
This section will look at the concept of sovereignty of the French Opposition National 
Front and its leader Marine Le Pen, the Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and the 
ruling political party in Poland (PiS). The attitude of PiS differs little from that of the 
Hungarian administration; however, Poles are more enthusiastically supportive of 
Christian values (Duda, 2018). 
Community and identification  
In the nationalist and nation-centric narrative of sovereignty, the community is bound 
through past narratives of culture, shared memory and customs. The narrative projected 
by the National Front in France is closely linked to the French Revolution, which is 
understood to have established the French Republic and the sovereignty of the people. 
The identification with the community takes place through the revolution as an inherited 
historical narrative, a form of customary knowledge (Lyotard, 1979, p. 38) making it 
inaccessible to those outside of that custom. In the narrative of Front National that means 
the community cannot include foreigners, immigrants or non-French nationals (Le Pen, 
2017) because they lack participatory identification with such a historical narrative and 
can not0 partake in the process of historical identification. 
Similar stories prevail in Hungary and Poland. The path of formation of both communities 
was marked by many wars and dependencies. The closest shared experience is the 
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establishment of communism in both states and the narrative of sovereignty for both 
states enjoyed a revival with their independence in 1989. These communities still have 
vivid memories of years of oppression and are therefore particularly sensitive. At the same 
time, the far-right creates a narrative of new and supposedly ‘external’ enemies, mostly in 
the form immigrants. The Hungarian far-right government seeks to strengthen the 
perception of the Other as an enemy, while internal enemies include all federalists seeking 
to turn the EU into an institution where decisions are taken from above.  
Unity and purpose.  
In this narrative, unity must remain within the nation. It is shared by nations with other 
members of the EU community when needed, such as in the fight against terrorism or 
cooperation on migration. In 2017, during the presidential election, Le Pen (2017) stated 
that France should reduce immigration to zero, fight multiculturalism, return the French 
sovereignty that the European Commission had “appropriated” and pursue a Europe of 
independent nations (Le Pen, 2017). The vision of sovereignty is shared by the Hungarian 
(Székely, 2017a; 2017b) and Polish (Than, Szakacs & Stonestreet, 2018) administrations. 
Likewise, Hungary and Poland foster a narrative in which they do not intend to change 
the boundaries of the sovereign nation and not expand a territorially nation-centric 
narrative of sovereignty.  
The principle of self-determination and sovereign.  
In this narrative, decision-making belongs to the nation and the sovereign is the nation. 
Orbán (2019) says: “every nation and Member State has the right to decide on how to 
organise its life in its own country” (Herszenhorn, 2018). The people are the hero of this 
narrative, legitimising power and giving their leaders the right to act. This part of the 
narrative is also related to the narrative about the autocracy of EU institutions (especially 
the European Commission) and their inability to act promptly, which also translates into 
questions on the legitimacy of the EC’s decision-making power. In this narrative, the 
European Commission should be “a simple technical secretariat” that serves the European 
Council (Marlowe, 2019) instead.  
In summary, the narrative of national(ist) and nation-centric sovereignty is deeply rooted 
in historical narratives, which underline its exclusionary nature. It relates to the 
expectation that people can live in a Europe of nation-states and negotiate and share 
sovereignty only when it serves a strategic purpose. In this narrative, the connection is 
created between the past and expectations that could be broken by promoters of EU 









EU sovereignty National(ist) and nation-
centric sovereignty  
Self-identification with a 
particular community 
(who are we?)  
• ES citizens made up of member 
states’ citizens 
• Nations lose relevance. 
• Community bound by values 
including democracy, identity 
• Community as a nation 
• Common past narratives 
through culture, revolutions 
and traumas 
• Community is exclusive 
Unity and purpose  
(what order do we want?) 
• Europe united and coherent within 
itself 
• De-territorialisation (in cultural, 
economic and political level) of 
member states 
• In-territorialisation of the whole 
union 
• Identification of friend (African, 
Mediterranean, British and 
Norwegian states) and enemy 
(China, US, Russia) dialectic 
• European Republic 
• member states sovereignty remains 
only as a symbol 
• Unity shared with member 
states when needed 
• Europe of independent 
nations 
• Protection of Christian 
culture 
• Terrorisation (in culture, 
political and legislative level)  




• Problem with sovereign 
• Change EU governance 
mechanisms 
• Centralisation and more decision-
making at the EU level 
• Self-determination by EU citizens 
through the representatives in EP 
• Decision-making belongs to 
the nation 
• Sovereign-people of states 
giving their leaders the right 
to act 
Interpretation and Conclusions 
The concept proposed by proponents of EU-centric sovereignty is based on elements of 
traditionally perceived sovereignty: territory, community, us-them dialectics, 
establishment “through revolution”, however, conceptually the boundaries of such 
sovereignty and the ‘glue’ of such community changes (for a summary of positions see 
table 2). The aim is to give more shaping power to the EU institutions and centralise 
decision-making in defence, health care, tax system, ecological, digital and the social 
spheres. Such authority based on public opinion should be acquired by the EP, reflecting 
the will of the European people. This narrative of sovereignty does not change its 
traditional content; it only changes the object, moving from the state to the supra-state. 
As the EU faces multiple challenge, it is trying to establish and recognise its sovereignty, 
which also translates into a new image of power. The narrative intends to create the 
European Republic after a successful “revolution”. 
Proponents of a nationalistic, nation-centric sovereignty equally rely on their history and 
the narrative of the revolution and the traditions of a Christian Europe. The far-right 
creates a narrative around the community that has a special connection between the past 
and their objectives. In this narrative sovereignty ‘belongs’ to the (territorially bound) 
state, which is established by the common will of the people, and this can neither be shared 
nor relinquished. The aim is a union of nation-states, where the main decisions are made 
by states, rather than the European Council and the EP or the main institutions of the EU.  
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In this situation, the ambitions of the two groups are different. In practice, nations still 
exist but in theory, only EU citizens are to remain. Viewed through the prism of the 
strategic narrative theory, the formation of the concept of sovereignty takes place through 
its idea projection and perception. While the concept of sovereignty can divide or can be 
a means to forge unity among community members – at the expense of those that 
sovereignty excludes – its application and narration is very difficult and complex. I have 
shown that two fundamentally different narratives on sovereignty of the EU or within 
Europe correspond to strategic objectives and historical narratives that equally ‘write’ the 
role of the people and the state. Looking forward, the EU will have to engage in 
conversations around different models of sovereignty, while granting sufficient space to 
engaging with ‘alternative’ narratives, however uncomfortable or contradictory they may 
be.  
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